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“Pivoting”, or a strategic shift in the direction of a 
venture, may be one of the most recognizable terms in 
entrepreneurship.  Although this term has entered the 
entrepreneurial lexicon, very little is known about the 
impact pivoting has on new venture performance. Some 
studies suggest pivoting has positive effects on 
performance while others suggest executing too many 
pivots adversely affect it.  This paper seeks to better 
understand the impact of multiple pivots on revenue by 
investigating the moderating roles of pivot severity (the 
degree to which a pivot represent a market shift) and 
reliance on investors.  We investigate the impact of 
multiple pivots on revenue, distinguishing between 
high-tech vs low-tech startups and between mild vs 
severe pivots.  We also investigate the impact that equity 
investments have on the pivot-revenue relationship of 
high-tech firms. Using change in a venture’s NAICS 
code as a proxy for pivoting, we find an inverted-U 
relationship between magnitude of pivots and the 
likelihood of revenue among Kauffman Firm Survey 
participants.  Among high-tech firms, this relationship 
differs based on the firm’s reliance on investors. This 
longitudinal empirical study on the relationship 
between pivot magnitude, investor reliance, and 
revenue aims to attract attention to this important topic 
of entrepreneurship, and help the entrepreneur facing 





In the face of unexpected events, entrepreneurs must 
decide whether to persevere with their original idea or 
pivot away from it.  Those events can either be the belief 
that the existing business model is not viable, for 
example problems in the development process [1, 2] or 
the perception of new opportunities and possibilities for 
expansion [3].  
The term “pivot” was first coined by Eric Ries in 
2009 [4] and defined as “a structured course correction 
designed to test a new fundamental hypothesis” [2] (pg 
149) explaining that “we keep one foot rooted in what 
we’ve learned so far, while making a fundamental 
change in strategy in order to seek greater validated 
learning” (pg 154).  The term is now part of the 
everyday language of entrepreneurs and those who 
advise and fund them.    
While some think of a pivot as “an especially radical 
type of organizational change for new ventures” [5] (pg 
3), the degree to which a pivot changes a business model 
can fall anywhere within a wide range of severity.  At 
one end, entrepreneurs conduct validated learning 
incrementally by varying slightly a single element of 
their business model.  Alternatively, entrepreneurs can 
make a radical change to their strategy, such as changing 
multiple elements of their business model [3, 6] or 
pivoting to a radically different market. The decision to 
continue with the current strategy or pivot away from it 
is one of the hardest that entrepreneurs face [2].  
The entrepreneurship literature promotes and 
celebrates pivoting with anecdotes of successful pivots, 
treating strategic change as an appropriate move and 
assuming it was a correct and necessary decision [3].  
For example, Groupon began as a do-good site called 
The Point, PayPal started as cryptography libraries for 
Palm Pilot devices, YouTube started as a video-dating 
site, and Twitter began as a platform to subscribe to 
podcasts [7].   
There are many reasons an entrepreneur would 
decide to pivot. Staying with a business idea that is not 
working could have severe consequences particularly 
for a start-up, which is often focused on a single project.  
Questioning and refining underperforming business 
models helps entrepreneurs discover and assess 
alternatives, empirically gather valuable market 
information, and make better strategic decisions [8]. 
Failure followed by pivoting is often considered a 
validated learning process [2, 4].  Research has also 
found that business model viability is greatly improved 





by business model experimentation. For example, 
pivoting is the most frequently occurring commonality 
among different successful startups [2] and committing 
too early to a specific business model can have negative 
effects on long-term survival and performance [6].  
Furthermore, most pivots are reactions to external, 
rather than internal events, such as negative customer 
reactions to the initial product, an inability to survive 
competition, technology issues, and positive responses 
from an unforeseen customer segment [1].  
However, pivoting is not a guarantee for success.  
One core problem inherent in changing direction is it 
can consume resources and move entrepreneurs away 
from competencies.  As entrepreneurs build their 
businesses, they become increasingly knowledgeable in 
the associated processes, technologies and markets. This 
tacit knowledge may become irrelevant when pivoting 
severely, resulting in lost time and resources [9]. 
Another core problem is that while firms may need to 
radically change direction in order to survive, doing so 
risks alienating stakeholders that had helped sustain the 
firm up to that point [5], including investors, employees, 
and partners. 
Entrepreneurs therefore should be mindful of the 
frequency and severity of their pivots.  Ladd [10] found 
that while ventures that tested hypotheses performed 
better than those that did not, there was no relationship 
between the number of validated hypotheses and a 
venture’s subsequent success (i.e., more pivots are not 
necessarily better) and that a consistent strategy might 
appeal to investors better than continuous market tests.   
Currently there is a gap in the understanding of the 
consequences of pivoting, which deserves attention for 
researchers and practitioners alike.  Prior work tends to 
be conceptual [11-13], qualitative [3, 6, 14], or 
quantitative in the context of established firms [15, 16]. 
Research on startup pivots tends to focus on 
antecedents, i.e. what triggers a pivot, such as feedback, 
environmental factors, entrepreneur characteristics, or 
investment [1, 9, 17].  For example, the willingness of 
founders to change their ideas in response to feedback 
may depend in part on their “psychological ownership” 
of those ideas, meaning the degree to which those ideas 
are seen as extensions of themselves [18].  
Entrepreneurs who focus on the exploitation of new 
opportunities tend to be flexible and responsive to new 
information, while entrepreneurs who focus on 
innovation through novel ventures tend to reject any 
change that could undermine venture novelty [19].  
Additionally, entrepreneurs who are reliant on investors 
may find it more difficult to pivot [9].    
In general, existing research and knowledge on 
pivots is limited and there has been a call for better 
understanding of its impact in new ventures [1, 3, 8].    
This study helps fill the research gap in a number of 
ways. First, we use the Kauffman Firm Survey 
longitudinal dataset to empirically investigate the 
relationship between the likelihood of startup success 
and its pivot activity.  Second, recent studies of pivot 
activities [1, 17] noted that firms usually engage in 
multiple pivots.  However, multiple pivots do not 
always lead to revenue and can result in an inverted-U 
relationship with the likelihood of success [10, 20].  This 
study looks to advance our understanding of pivots by 
investigating pivot severity. Does the impact of multiple 
pivots on likelihood of startup success differ by the 
severity of the pivots?  Does this impact differ between 
high-tech and low-tech startups?  Furthermore, in the 
context of high-tech firms, this study also investigates 
the moderating role of investor reliance.   
Entrepreneurs need to persevere when facing 
adversity and skepticism.  However they must also be 
flexible enough to leave behind some of the ideas in 
which they invested, and explore different opportunities 
[9]. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is 
the first of its kind to address the issue of the likelihood 
of pivoting success with respect to pivot severity, firm 
type, and investor reliance.    
 
2. Framework and Hypotheses 
 
Pivots have been defined as “course changes”, 
“strategy shifts”, or “business model adaptations”.  A 
pivot is often considered as an experiment to validate a 
business model hypothesis [2, 21] and the path 
entrepreneurs must take when looking for the correct 
strategy.  In other words, a pivot is often synonymous 
with change.  Startups can make different types of pivots 
such as changes to the product/service, target customer 
segment, business architecture, value proposition, 
engine of growth, channel, and technology [2].   
Some pivots are considered incremental where a 
small element of the product, service, or business model 
is changed, or simple elements are added or dropped 
from an existing strategy.  Other pivots can be 
significant and change multiple elements of the business 
model or completely reorganize the current strategy [3, 
6].  Startups typically make a series of small pivots to 
reach a successful strategy, commonly defined as one 
that achieves revenue [3, 17, 22] (a venture usually does 
not achieve profit, which is more desirable than revenue, 
until its growth phase that follows the startup phase).  
Startups undergo an average of five pivots during their 
development [17]. 
The term “pivot” has become so ubiquitous that even 
the popular press is criticizing using the word to mean 
almost anything [23], writing that “100 micro-
adjustments to business models” is smart management, 
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not pivoting.  Literature has also questioned when does 
change become a pivot [3].  Thus, any in-depth analysis 
of pivoting should consider both the number of pivots 
executed by a venture, and the severity of these pivots.  
This study investigates pivots that are significant 
enough to cause a change in the startup’s North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 
code.  The NAICS code of a firm reflects the firm’s 
value proposition, i.e., what it offers and to whom.  
Thus, a pivot that significantly changes a firm’s product, 
service, or target market (e.g., wholesale or retail) will 
also change the firm’s NAICS code.  
The hierarchy of the six-digit NAICS code lends 
itself to a measurement of pivot severity; the two most 
significant (i.e., leftmost) digits of a firm represent the 
firm’s sector, and each subsequent digit identifies a 
smaller sector subset in which the firm operates.  The 
smallest measureable pivot would change the least 
significant (i.e., rightmost) digit whereas more severe 
pivots would change a more significant digit, and the 
most severe pivot would change the most significant 
digit.  We can thus quantify the severity of a pivot as the 
position of the most significant NAICS digit changed by 
the pivot, i.e., the number of digits in the difference 
between the NAICS code before and after the pivot. 
While pivoting can improve a startup’s strategy, 
pivoting too frequently and/or too severely can defeat it.  
This study looks at the relationship between startup 
success (revenue) and pivoting behavior, accounting for 
both the number and severity of pivots by using the 
concept of cumulative pivot severity, which is the 
running sum of the severity of all the pivots executed by 
a venture since its inception.  Therefore, we 
hypothesize:  
 
H1: The likelihood of revenue for a startup exhibits an 
inverted-U relationship with its cumulative pivot 
severity. 
 
Most High-tech firms operate in greater market 
uncertainty than low-tech firms because the formers’ 
business models tend to be more innovative.  High-tech 
firms may therefore benefit more from the business 
model validation offered by pivoting.  Moreover, 
frequent testing, tweaking and pivoting may be viable 
for digital and virtual assets (e.g., websites and apps), 
but not for traditional manufactured goods.  Because, 
high-tech companies might need and tolerate more 
severe pivoting than low-tech companies, we 
hypothesize: 
 
H2: The relationship between a startup’s probability of 
revenue and cumulative pivot severity is different for 
high-tech and low-tech firms 
 
It remains unclear how free ventures are to follow a 
radically new direction if investors oppose the new 
strategy.  One advantage of equity funding is that there 
is no obligation to repay the money thereby not adding 
to the financial burden of the company.  However, a 
disadvantage of equity funding is that investors have to 
be consulted on strategic decisions.  When a pivot is 
looming, investors are more likely to intervene.   
Entrepreneurs’ commitments to investors can lead to 
a “fixation” to ideas that reduces the flexibility required 
to pivot [9].  Investors are not always supportive of 
continued change and refrain from injecting large 
amounts of capital until progress has been made.  
Successive radical pivots can weaken investor 
commitment because they begin to question whether the 
business model was wrong, if a problem lies with the 
entrepreneurs [24], or if pivots are the onset of mission 
drift [18].  
Finally, the level of resources an entrepreneur has 
impacts the likelihood that a firm will pivot.  
Continually changing direction demands renewed 
resources and entrepreneurs may have to commit to one 
strategy or another.  At the same time, while constrained 
resources may prevent entrepreneurs from effectively 
pivoting, too many resources might reduce the need to 
pivot. “A tendency to continue with the venture in its 
current form might only be overcome when it is clear 
that venture is unsustainable. Entrepreneurs seldom 
pivot just because of new opportunities, but because of 
constraints and an inability to satisfy those constraints 
without initiating change. These constraints might 
require entrepreneurs to proceed to the next funding 
cycle or demonstrate market demand to investors.” [9] 
(pg 59)  
Without these constraints pivots are less likely and 
initial ideas can be pursued for longer.  An entrepreneur 
interviewee stated “… whenever you’re living on 
someone else’s money and there’s no criteria for ‘live or 
die’ it’s just easy. I’ve seen it […] where the government 
has put so much money in technology companies to fund 
the risk that they [the government] don’t have the 
confidence to say ‘show us purchase orders.’ So the 
entrepreneur’s not forced to pivot.” [9] (pg 59). 
Given the above arguments, we hypothesized that: 
 
H3: The relationship between likelihood of revenue and 
cumulative pivot severity is different between high-tech 
firms that rely on investor funding and those that do not. 
 
3. Data and Methods  
 
This study uses the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS) of 
4928 companies founded in 2004 and surveyed annually 
from 2004 to 2011 [25].  The KFS collects information 
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about each participating firm’s business characteristics, 
strategy and innovation, business organization and 
human resource benefits, business finances, work 
behavior, and ownership and demographics of its active 
owner and operators.  Specifically, the study uses the 
confidential longitudinal long-format KFS dataset 
(KFS8_L_L1) hosted by the National Opinion Research 
Center (NORC) Data Enclave for the Kauffman 
Foundation [26].  Unlike the public version of the KFS 
which provides only the most significant two digits of 
each firm’s NAICS code, the confidential dataset 
provides all six digits, enabling the study to detect more 
subtle pivots that only impact the less significant digits. 
Because the KFS collects data once a year, we can 
detect one change annually in a firm’s NAICS code.  
The KFS also reports for each year if each surviving 
participant received any revenue, considered itself a 
high-tech firm or not, and if it received any form of 
equity investment.  Not all ventures survive each year, 
leaving the study with 18,286 records, each one 
representing a year of a surviving venture. 
We compute the severity of each pivot sij as the 
number of digits in the difference between the NAICS 
code reported by venture i in years j and j-1.  From these 
pivot severity values, we compute the cumulative pivot 
severity of venture i at year t as running sum 
 





To test H1, we model the binary variable revenue r(t) 
as a second order logistic regression of c(t) and c2(t) and 
test for the statistical significance of the second-order 
term, which needs to negative for an inverted-U 
relationship.  To test H2, we add the binary variable hij 
(0=venture i is not a high-tech venture in year j, 1=yes) 
and its interactions with c(t) and c2(t) to the H1 logistic 
regression model, and test for the statistical significance 
of the interaction terms.  To test H3, we add the binary 
variable eij (0=venture i did not rely on equity 
investment in year j, 1=yes) and its interactions with c(t) 
and c2(t) to the H1 logistic regression model, and test 
among high-tech ventures for the statistical significance 
of the interaction terms. 
 
4. Results  
 
Within the 18,286 records, we detected 1725 NAICS 
code changes, with a distribution biased towards severe 
pivots (Table 1).  Over 90% of the venture-years 
exhibited no changes to the NAICS code.  The 
cumulative pivot severity ranged from zero to 30. 
 
Table 1.  Distribution of pivot severity across all 
startups and years of survival. 
Severity Count  
0 16561 90.6%  









2 137 0.7% 
3 237 1.3% 
4 155 0.8% 
5 470 2.6% 
6 641 3.5% 
    Total: 18286 100%  
 
 
The second order coefficient in the logistic 
regression of cumulative pivot severity on revenue is 
negative and statistically significant (“All Firms” 
column in Table 2), confirming H1.  The revenue odds 
ratio is maximum at a cumulative pivot severity of 13 
(green curve in Figure 1).   
 
 
Table 2.  First and second order coefficients of 
cumulative pivot severity regression on revenue. 
 All Firms Low Tech High Tech 
c(t)    0.0569***    0.0505***    0.0903* 
c2(t)   -0.0022**   -0.0013 (NS)   -0.0072*** 
 




Figure 1.  Revenue odds ratio versus cumulative 
pivot severity (high vs low tech). 
 
Adding hij to the model yields a statistically 
significant interaction (p<0.01) between the high-tech 
designation and the second order term c2(t).  For both 
low-tech and high-tech ventures, the relationship 
between revenue and cumulative pivot severity is an 
inverted-U (“Low Tech” and “High Tech” columns in 
Table 2), but the optimum pivoting behaviors are 
different.  A small amount of pivoting helps tech 
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startups achieve revenue more than low-tech startups 
(the red curve in Figure 1 goes up steeply), but too many 
or too large pivots penalizes tech startups severely (the 
red curve plummets).  In contrast, the optimum pivoting 
behavior for low-tech firms involves more severe 
pivoting (blue curve in Figure 1), but the benefits of 
pivoting and the penalty for over-pivoting are not as 
drastic (the blue curve in Figure 1 is flatter than the red 
curve).  H2 is thus confirmed. 
A regression of eij, c(t) and c2(t) with interaction 
terms on revenue yields a statistically significant 
interaction (p<0.05) between equity investments and the 
second order term c2(t).  The optimal cumulative pivot 
severity for startups with equity is similar to that of 
firms without equity (red vs blue curves in Figure 2), but 
the consequences of under-pivoting or over-pivoting, 
and the overall likelihood of revenue, is lower for 
ventures with equity investments.  H3 is thus confirmed. 
 
 
Table 3.  First and second order coefficients of 
cumulative pivot severity regression on revenue. 
 All High Tech  No Equity Equity 
c(t)    0.0903**    0.1096*    0.0863* 
c2(t)   -0.0072**   -0.0099**   -0.0059* 
 




Figure 2.  Revenue odds ratio versus cumulative 
pivot severity (equity vs no equity investments). 
 
5. Discussion, Limitations, and Future 
Research 
 
Startups make assumptions about the unknown that 
generally turn out wrong, and “new ventures inevitably 
experience deviations - often huge ones - from their 
original planned targets. Indeed, new ventures frequently 
require fundamental redirection” [27].  This study 
investigates the impact of the magnitude of the “often 
huge” deviations on the likelihood of revenue.  We also 
identify a potential hazard for new ventures that rely on 
external funding; pivoting in this situation is far from a 
“cost free” strategic option, as is often portrayed in the 
emerging literature. 
The study confirms the three proposed hypotheses, 
but the last two in counterintuitive ways.  In H2, we 
confirm a difference between the inverted-U curves of 
high-tech and low-tech revenue likelihood as a function 
of pivoting.  This difference, however, was not as 
expected.  We argued that because business model 
uncertainty is more prevalent in high-tech ventures than 
in low-tech ventures, the former would need more 
pivoting.  Instead, we find that high-tech ventures are 
best served by a pivoting strategy with smaller 
cumulative severity.   
In H3, we confirm that equity influences the 
inverted-U curves of high-tech revenue likelihood as a 
function of pivoting.  However, we expected equity 
investors to penalize high-tech ventures for overzealous 
pivoting and shy away from additional investment in the 
immediate aftermath of a pivot [28].  Instead, we find 
that equity investment flattens the inverted-U curve 
altogether, while high-tech ventures without investors 
have more to gain by pivoting and more to lose from 
overzealous pivoting. 
There are several limitations to this study.  The first 
is that the KFS does not reveal multiple pivots that may 
have occurred between annual follow-ups, but only if 
there is a year-to-year difference in NAICS code.  
Second, the model presented in this paper does not 
differentiate between a pivot executed shortly after 
venture formation from a pivot executed later (e.g. 2005 
vs. 2010); both contribute equally to the cumulative 
pivot severity, but one would expect strategic benefit to 
executing swiftly.  
We show that the impact of pivoting on the 
likelihood of revenue is significant in both the practical 
and statistical sense.  However, we also propose to the 
entrepreneurship research community that a better 
understanding of the dynamics of pivoting are required 
before we can provide actionable guidance to the 
entrepreneur facing the difficult decision of whether or 
not to pivot. 
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